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ABSTRACT 
  When the renowned plaintiffs’ firm Milberg Weiss was indicted in 
2006 for paying kickbacks to clients, most commentators saw the 
scandal as the product of five dishonest lawyers. This Note argues that 
the causes were more complex than the moral shortcomings of a few 
attorneys; rather, the kickbacks were but one symptom of a deeply 
flawed system for selecting lead counsel in securities class action 
lawsuits. Although the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 attempted to curb abusive behavior by the plaintiffs’ bar, its 
focus on reforming plaintiff behavior meant that attorneys were left 
relatively free to continue using whichever tactic served their financial 
ends. Using Milberg Weiss’s behavior to guide analysis, this Note 
assesses the problems of lead-counsel selection. These problems trace 
to a common source: an imbalance of information between attorneys 
vying for appointment as lead counsel and the judge who must select 
one of these attorneys. To correct this problem, this Note proposes 
implementing screening and signaling procedures to determine the 
“most adequate counsel” who can provide quality representation for 
every member of a class. 
 
Copyright © 2008 by James P. McDonald. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2009; Bowdoin College, A.B. 2005.  
  I thank Professor Ogden N. Lewis for his wise oversight of this Note, as well as Joshua 
Haber, Kelly Taylor, Mom, and Dad for their thoughtful comments along the way. In the course 
of researching and writing this Note, I contacted a number of individuals for interviews, 
including William Lerach, who graciously shared his time and assistance. Some people I 
contacted chose to participate in these interviews, and some chose to participate only on the 
condition of anonymity. In the case of anonymous sources who permitted me to use their 
information, I have cited those sources as “Confidential Source” with no other identifying 
information to respect their requests for anonymity. Please accept my apologies for the absence 
of information but take my strongest assurances that all sources are quoted and represented 
accurately in the pursuit of the truth. 
MCDONALD IN FINAL[1].DOC 11/16/2008  10:26:16 PM 
506 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:505 
INTRODUCTION 
This is the story of the lawyer, William Lerach, who took on 
Enron, won $7 billion for his clients, and was headed for federal 
prison before the Enron case ended. It is also the story of his former 
law firm, Milberg Weiss, whose Enron-like collapse in 2006 for fraud 
and obstruction of justice transformed a legal powerhouse into a legal 
pariah. But, mostly, it is the story of how the class action system failed 
to protect American investors who lost billions of dollars to corporate 
fraud and malfeasance. 
Until its 2006 indictment by federal prosecutors in California,1 
the law firm of Milberg Weiss dominated the securities class action 
plaintiffs’ bar.2 Led by two skilled plaintiffs’ lawyers with reputations 
matching their paychecks, Melvyn Weiss (the firm’s cofounder) and 
William Lerach (the firm’s most prominent attorney), Milberg Weiss 
was one of the most prominent plaintiffs’ firms in America from the 
early 1980s until 2006.3 The firm survived a bipartisan Congress 
determined to destroy it,4 new procedural laws aimed at curbing its 
influence,5 and constant criticism from American business interests 
and the academy.6 Milberg Weiss fancied itself the voice of the little 
guy, the defrauded investor, in a battle against large corporate 
 
 1. First Superseding Indictment at 24–78, 84–89, 94–96, 100–01, United States v. Milberg 
Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, CR 05-587(A)-DDP (C.D. Cal. filed May 18, 2006) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 2. For an examination of the statistics on Milberg Weiss’s dominance of the market, see 
infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. 
 3. For information regarding Milberg Weiss’s market share in the securities class actions 
market, see infra Parts I.A, II.B. 
 4. See Joseph Nocera, The Lawyer Companies Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at 
C1 (“In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, whose purpose, in 
part, was to put Mr. Lerach out of business.”). 
 5. See id. (describing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act). 
 6. See Peter Elkind, The King of Pain is Hurting, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2000, at 190, 198 
(“For Silicon Valley companies especially, a number of which Lerach sued repeatedly, dealing 
with Milberg became predictable—‘like paying a toll to cross the Bay Bridge,’ says San 
Francisco defense attorney Doug Schwab. They called it ‘getting Lerached.’”). For a discussion 
of academic criticism of Lerach’s and Milberg Weiss’s tactics, see infra Part II.B. 
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interests.7 In that battle, it claims to have won more than $45 billion in 
settlements and judgments for its clients since 1965.8 
But, as this Note details, some of the tactics that Milberg Weiss 
used to reach the top of the plaintiffs’ bar were as fraudulent and 
unethical as any action taken at Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco.9 
Between the mid-1970s and 2005, Milberg Weiss paid more than $11.3 
million in kickbacks to clients who agreed to serve as plaintiffs in class 
action lawsuits.10 Prompting its own clients to file the first lawsuit in a 
class action meant that the firm would control the litigation as lead 
counsel, a position that guaranteed it the highest percentage of legal 
fees awarded from a settlement or judgment.11 
Every law firm in the plaintiffs’ bar aspires to appointment as 
lead counsel in a securities class action lawsuit, for the financial 
rewards can be astronomical.12 Prior to 1995, lead-counsel status 
typically was awarded to the first plaintiff and lawyer to file a lawsuit, 
a rule that led many lawyers to file “strike suits,” poorly researched 
private actions based on little more than a hunch that fraud had 
occurred.13 Although Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)14 to put an end to strike suits 
 
 7. Carrie Johnson, Guilty Plea to End Crusading Lawyer’s Lucrative Run, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 19, 2007, at A1 (“Having grown up in a working-class Pittsburgh home, Lerach regularly 
described himself as an advocate for ‘the little guy.’ Legal experts agree that his cases gave 
investors who lost money a new avenue to recover at least pennies on the dollar. His cases also 
infuriated his opponents in the corporate and political arena.”). 
 8. Russell Kamerman, Note, Securities Class Action Abuse: Protecting Small Plaintiffs’ Big 
Money, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 853, 854 (2007). 
 9. For a discussion of these scandals, which involved some of America’s most prominent 
corporations at the beginning of the twenty-first century, see generally Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 
(2005). 
 10. Second Superseding Indictment at 9–14, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & 
Schulman LLP., CR 05-587(D)-JFW (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20, 2007) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal); see also Peter Elkind, The Law Firm of Hubris Hypocrisy and Greed, FORTUNE, Nov. 
13, 2006, at 155, 156 (discussing the illegal kickbacks). 
 11. Elkind, supra note 10, at 160–61. 
 12. See Kamerman, supra note 8, at 855 (“Representing a class in a securities class action is 
a coveted position among law firms because a large amount of money is often at stake and the 
firm’s fee structure usually consists of a percentage of any settlement or judgment.”); Elkind, 
supra note 10, at 164 (noting that one David Bershad made approximately $161 million in 
approximately twenty-two years of practice at Milberg Weiss). 
 13. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Action, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2085–86 (1995). 
 14. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
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and other deceptive practices Milberg Weiss used to become lead 
counsel,15 the available data indicates that the PSLRA helped Milberg 
Weiss more than it hurt the firm.16 By 2006, Milberg Weiss and Lerach 
acted as lead counsel in approximately 60 percent of all securities 
class actions filed in the United States, and 80 percent of the 
securities class actions filed in California.17 Yet Milberg Weiss’s story 
is more than one of market domination; it is a legal tragedy about the 
repeated breach of the fiduciary duty that lead plaintiffs and their 
lawyers owe to absent class members.18 It is a breach against which the 
class action system continues to have no adequate defense. 
This Note criticizes the existing system of selecting lead counsel 
for inadequately preventing abusive attorney behavior and offers 
solutions to aid judges in more accurately selecting a lead counsel that 
meets the appropriate legal and moral standards. Exploring both the 
legal and illegal tactics Milberg Weiss used to garner lead-counsel 
status, this Note offers two contributions to securities law—one 
historical and one analytical. First, the Note presents a historical 
account of the Milberg Weiss fraud through the lens of the firm’s 
most famous attorney, William Lerach. Compiling a number of 
sources and firsthand accounts, including Mr. Lerach’s own words, 
this Note is the first academic narrative detailing the inner workings 
of the scandal in this manner. Second, this Note uses the facts of the 
Milberg Weiss scandal to elucidate why the PSLRA system for 
selecting lead counsel was poorly crafted and remains vulnerable to 
fraud. The drafters of the PSLRA neither identified nor corrected 
informational asymmetries that exist between plaintiffs’ attorneys and 
judges. Because plaintiffs’ attorneys continue to operate with vastly 
superior information about their clients, their own motivations, and 
the merits of a particular case, judges are unable to appraise the 
adequacy of the attorneys vying for lead counsel. Only by fostering or 
 
 15. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 913, 914–15. 
 16. See infra notes 165–75 and accompanying text. 
 17. Michael A. Drummond, Lerach Strikes Back, CAL. LAWYER, Sept. 4, 2002, at 23, 25, 
available at http://www.nera.com/MediaCoverage.asp?pr_ ID=1500. 
 18. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The lead 
plaintiff is not the sole client in a PSLRA class action; instead, the lead plaintiff serves as a 
fiduciary for the entire class. A court must therefore retain oversight over lead plaintiff’s 
compensation decisions in order to ensure that the lead plaintiff has fulfilled its fiduciary 
duties.”). 
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forcing disclosure between these actors can the legal system realize 
the goal of adequate representation for all class members. 
To tell the Milberg Weiss story and analyze the faults of the lead-
counsel-selection system, this Note is divided into three Parts. Part I 
examines the old system of lead-counsel selection and how that 
system led to the PSLRA, the law intended to check the plaintiffs’ 
bar. Part II details the Milberg Weiss system of lead-counsel 
selection, also known as the kickback scheme. The Part examines how 
the firm recruited plaintiffs, paid them to file lawsuits, and evaded 
detection by the courts. Part III analyzes the post–Milberg Weiss 
system, concludes that significant information asymmetries still exist 
to the detriment of class members, and suggests a new system of 
disclosure between attorneys and the courts to prevent the emergence 
of another Milberg Weiss. 
I.  THE OLD SYSTEM: THE RISE OF MILBERG WEISS 
Understanding Milberg Weiss’s fraud is possible only if one 
understands the system in which the fraud occurred. That system—
class action securities lawsuits—has been one of the most lucrative 
and controversial areas of American law since its emergence in the 
1970s. Until 1995, when Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, securities class actions were a race to the 
courthouse for both the industrious and the unscrupulous plaintiffs’ 
attorney. If an attorney could win that race (that is, file the first 
lawsuit), the chances of being appointed lead counsel and controlling 
the litigation were substantial. Part I explains this system and Milberg 
Weiss’s position in it. It discusses the history of Milberg Weiss and 
William Lerach, the concept of a strike suit, and the PSLRA. 
A. Milberg Weiss, Securities Class Actions, and William Lerach 
Based in New York City, the plaintiffs’ firm Milberg Weiss was 
founded in 1965 to represent consumers and investors against 
American business interests in securities-fraud lawsuits.19 In pursuing 
securities fraud, the firm’s founding partners, Lawrence Milberg and 
Melvyn Weiss,20 operated on the outskirts of what was viewed as 
 
 19. Milberg, Our Firm: About Milberg, http://www.milberg.com/firm/firm.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2008). 
 20. Martha Neil, Milberg Weiss on the Hot Seat: Should Law Firms Ever Be Indicted?, 
A.B.A. J., Dec. 2006, at 34, 36. 
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respectable by the legal profession of the time.21 Milberg Weiss 
remained a small firm throughout the early 1970s because firms 
handling this type of work had difficulty building substantial client 
bases that could support a large office of litigators.22 Nor was the 
practice particularly lucrative—securities cases, already few in 
number, rarely reached trial as defendant companies outlasted and 
outspent the plaintiff investors until the suits disappeared.23 
Times changed, however; following the 1966 amendment to Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure24 and the 1971 Supreme 
Court ruling in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co.,25 securities litigation began to prosper in the early 
1970s.26 In Superintendent of Insurance, the Court held that a private 
action could be initiated under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)27 to redress securities fraud.28 
Although the law had technically recognized private actions twenty-
five years prior to Superintendent of Insurance,29 the Court’s 
pronouncement that the securities laws “must be read flexibly, not 
 
 21. See Elkind, supra note 6, at 194 (“At the time shareholder litigation was a backwater, 
its practitioners viewed as bottom feeders.”). 
 22. See id. (noting that early firms focusing on securities work were “invariably small and 
underfunded”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (explaining the 
advisory committee’s motivations for a rule using more “practical” and less “abstract” language 
to describe the occasions for using the class action device); Milberg, supra note 19 (“In the 
Firm’s early years, its founding partners built a new area of legal practice in representing 
shareholders’ interests under the then recently amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allowed securities fraud cases, among others, to proceed as class actions.”). 
 25. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
 26. Kamerman, supra note 8, at 857. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 28. Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12–13 (“The crux of the present case is that [the 
private company] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of 
securities as an investor. . . . ‘In this situation the private right of action recognized under Rule 
10b-5 is available as a remedy for the corporate disability.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Shell v. 
Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970))). 
 29. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 366 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens noted, 
The private cause of action for violating § 10(b) was first recognized in Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co. In recognizing this implied right of action, Judge Kirkpatrick 
merely applied what was then a well-settled rule of federal law. As was true during 
most of our history, the federal courts then presumed that a statute enacted to benefit 
a special class provided a remedy for those members injured by violations of the 
statute. 
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)). 
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technically and restrictively”30 seemed to be a boon for securities class 
actions.31 In this new era of private actions, plaintiffs’ attorneys now 
could couple private suits alleging misrepresentation of material facts 
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,32 Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act,33 or specific Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rules34 (for example, Rule 10b-5)35 with the class action 
mechanism to pose a considerable financial threat to large 
corporations. As a result, a “significant portion of the private 
litigation under the securities laws occur[red] through . . . class 
action[s].”36 A class of defrauded investors could recover their losses 
resulting from corporate misstatements or omissions directly from the 
corporate coffers.37 Because these suits pitted stockholders (the 
owners) against their own company, many business interests viewed 
(and view) these suits as a blight on the American market system.38 
Most often, plaintiffs filed suit immediately after a significant drop in 
a company’s stock price or the release of news extremely detrimental 
to the interests of stockholders, with little time for a thorough 
 
 30. Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12. 
 31. See Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
1988, at B7 (noting an increase of class actions in the early 1970s followed by a decrease as 
courts began to institute stricter standards). But see Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical 
Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971–1978, 
60 B.U. L. REV. 306, 306–07, 321 (1980) (suggesting that shareholder litigation only marginally 
increased during the 1970s). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 34. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2054 n.1. This Note’s primary concern is not with 
the law behind securities lawsuits. For this Note’s purposes, Judge Henry Friendly’s summary of 
the law should suffice: 
The purpose of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to protect persons who are deceived in 
securities transactions—to make sure that buyers of securities get what they think 
they are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into parting with 
something for a price known to the buyer to be inadequate or for a consideration 
known to the buyer not to be what it purports to be. 
Chem. Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 36. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 753 (5th ed. 2006). 
 37. ADAM C. PRITCHARD, SHOULD CONGRESS REPEAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
REFORM? 4 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 471, 2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ 
pas/pa471.pdf. 
 38. Id. at 3–4; Elkind, supra note 6, at 192 (reporting one venture capitalist’s description of 
Lerach as a “cunning economic terrorist”). 
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investigation into potential fraud.39 With the potential monetary 
losses at trial often ranging into the billions, many suits settled quickly 
for only a fraction of their potential worth.40 
It was into this increasingly lucrative practice of law that a young 
attorney named William Lerach entered when Melvyn Weiss 
convinced him to join Milberg Weiss in 1976.41 Weiss believed that by 
recruiting talented lawyers from the defense bar, he could make the 
traditionally disparaged practice of securities litigation respectable 
and, more importantly, prosperous.42 This belief led him to recruit 
Lerach, then a young partner at Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay in 
Pittsburgh.43 At the time, Milberg Weiss was still relatively small and 
headed by founders Milberg and Weiss and another young attorney, 
David Bershad; “Milberg was the founder; Weiss was the driving 
force; Bershad managed the firm’s finances.”44 Lerach conditioned his 
move to Milberg Weiss upon his opening a San Diego office for the 
firm, despite the fact that hardly any shareholder litigation occurred 
on the West Coast at the time.45 “Milberg West,”46 as the office 
 
 39. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2085–86; see also infra notes 71–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 40. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 (1991) (“Although trial is our paradigm of how civil 
litigation resolves disputes, in reality only a tiny fraction of litigated cases—perhaps five percent 
or less—are actually tried to judgment. Most cases are resolved through settlement. Indeed, 
federal policy (and probably that of most states) favors settlement over trial, to such an extent 
that it is a ‘familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.’” 
(quoting In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986))). 
 41. See Drummond, supra note 17, at 24 (“Lerach made the jump to Milberg Weiss in 
March 1976, and Mel Weiss became his mentor.”); William Greider, Is This America’s Top 
Corporate Crime Fighter?, NATION, Aug. 5, 2002, at 11, 14 (“‘I saw in those days that, if the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers had two things—money and brains—they could do it. But money was the 
most important thing because the companies have the money.’ Milberg Weiss, which he joined 
in the late 1970s, has plenty of both.” (quoting William Lerach)); Timothy L. O’Brien, Behind 
the Breakup of the Kings of Tort, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 3 (Business), at 1 (“Mr. Lerach 
joined the firm in 1976 as Mr. Weiss’s pupil . . . .”). 
 42. See Elkind, supra note 6, at 194 (“Weiss thought that if he could attract some good 
defense lawyers to his side, he could level the playing field and gain a measure of status, which 
he craved.”). 
 43. E-mail from William S. Lerach to author (Dec. 11, 2007, 14:02:19 EST) (confidential 
source on file with author) [hereinafter Lerach, First E-mail]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Elkind, supra note 6, at 194. 
 46. Lerach headed Milberg West from the late 1970s until 2004, when the firm, then 
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, formally split into two separate firms. Milberg Weiss 
Becomes 2 Firms, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at C4. As a result of the split, the New York office 
became Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, whereas Lerach’s West Coast operation became 
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became known, would eventually become the hub for shareholder 
litigation not only at Milberg Weiss but also nationwide, developing a 
reputation for aggressiveness and success representing investors.47 
After arriving in San Diego and establishing Milberg West, 
Lerach rapidly ascended the heights of the California plaintiffs’ bar, 
establishing his reputation during a four-year ordeal known as the 
Pacific Homes case. In 1981, Lerach filed suit on behalf of two 
thousand retirees against Pacific Homes Corporation, which operated 
retirement homes, and the United Methodist Church.48 At first glance, 
the church was unrelated to the bankruptcy, but Lerach sued anyway 
on the theory that it was the “sponsoring entity” of Pacific Homes.49 
After four years, three petitions to the Supreme Court, and four 
months of trial, the church settled with Lerach for $21 million50 in 
addition to undisclosed future payments.51 The large settlement 
vaulted Lerach into the national spotlight52 and firmly established 
Milberg Weiss as a force in California. Most importantly, though, the 
case foreshadowed what would become Lerach’s approach to 
securities lawsuits—“dreaming up new types of claims and naming 
new kinds of defendants—not just companies, but their accountants, 
bankers, lawyers, and PR firms.”53 The case even had traces of 
 
Lerach Coughlin Stoia & Robbins (Lerach Coughlin). Id. The federal indictment against 
Milberg Weiss this Note explores concerned only Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, not 
Lerach Coughlin. The activities alleged in the indictment, however, occurred during the period 
when the firm was still together as Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach. 
 47. Lerach, First E-mail, supra note 43. 
 48. Drummond, supra note 17, at 24. 
 49. To understand how the appellate court understood Lerach’s theory, see generally Barr 
v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). “In describing [the 
features of its services], Pacific Homes referred to itself as being sponsored by the Southern 
California Arizona Conference of the United Methodist Church and offered a special program 
of assistance to help a limited number of United Methodists.” Id. at 331; see also EDWARD M. 
GAFFNEY, JR. & PHILIP C. SORENSON, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 6, 7 (Howard R. Griffin ed., 1984) (describing Lerach’s theory 
that “Pacific Homes Corporation was the agent and alter ego of each of the other defendants, 
and had acted with their permission, knowledge, and consent, and within the scope of their 
authority”). 
 50. Suit on Retirement Homes Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1980, at A18. 
 51. Lerach, First E-mail, supra note 43. All told, the church paid more than $42.5 million to 
its elderly residents in the years following the settlement. Drummond, supra note 17, at 24. 
 52. In addition to regional and national newspaper coverage of the settlement, the CBS 
newsmagazine 60 Minutes aired a special on the Pacific Homes case, stirring “fears . . . that the 
denomination might throw Pacific Homes residents out onto the street if they couldn’t pay their 
fees.” Tim Tanton, United Methodists’ Pacific Homes Saga Ends on an Up Note, WORLDWIDE 
FAITH NEWS, Sept. 10, 1999, http://www.wfn.org/1999/09/msg00109.html. 
 53. Elkind, supra note 6, at 194. 
MCDONALD IN FINAL[1].DOC 11/16/2008  10:26:16 PM 
514 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:505 
Lerach’s well-chronicled asperity toward the defendants he pursued; 
after the Pacific Homes case ended, Lerach hung two sketches in his 
San Diego office—one showed himself as Saint George, and the other 
caricatured the United Methodist Church as a dragon.54 
As the 1980s progressed and the technology boom in California 
matured, Lerach and Milberg Weiss began to home in on the 
burgeoning securities activities that accompanied the birth and 
growth of Silicon Valley’s technology companies. Although the list of 
corporate defendants Lerach sued was a who’s who of the Fortune 
500, several of his cases from the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
particularly notable. Lerach and Milberg Weiss sued and won 
settlements against Nucorp Energy ($42.5 million),55 electronics and 
component producer Oak Industries (more than $30 million),56 
Drexel Burnham Lambert and Michael Milken (exposing and proving 
the existence of the Drexel “Daisy Chain”),57 Apple Computer ($100 
million judgment, which was later reduced on appeal),58 and Charles 
Keating’s American Financial Corporation ($240 million paid to 
settle the investor class action stemming from the Lincoln Savings & 
Loan scandal).59 Between 1989 and 1993 alone, Milberg Weiss and 
“other”60 plaintiffs’ firms in California filed class action suits against 
 
 54. Drummond, supra note 17, at 24. 
 55. Elkind, supra note 6, at 198–200 (detailing the story behind Lerach’s $42.5 million 
settlement, as well as the influence on the case of Daniel Fischel, future Dean of the University 
of Chicago Law School, who served as an expert witness for the defense). 
 56. Lerach, First E-mail, supra note 43. As part of the settlement, beyond monetary 
damages, the CEO of Oak Industries was barred from ever serving as an officer of a public 
company. Id. For further background on the litigation, see In re Oak Indus. Sec. Litig., No. 83-
0537-G(M), 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20942 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1986). 
 57. Lerach, First E-mail, supra note 43. Although unsubstantiated, the many settlements 
and suits against Drexel Burnham are thought to total more than $1 billion. Id. The exact total 
paid to plaintiffs is unclear, although $650 million has been reported. Jonathan Potts, Lead 
Attorney, PITT MAG., Mar. 2002, at 32, 33, available at http://www.pittmag.pitt.edu/mar2002/ 
feature4.html. For more information on the chain of events leading to the bankruptcy of Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, see The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Dismantling a Once-
Powerful House: Key Events for Drexel Burnham Lambert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1990, at D4. 
 58. Lawrence M. Fisher, The Pit Bull of Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at C4. 
 59. Lerach, First E-mail, supra note 43. 
 60. Journalists have reported that Lerach was almost always at least tangentially involved 
in securities suits filed in California, and it may be impossible to distinguish which suits, if any, 
Lerach did not have a hand in:  
Many of those who spoke to Fortune about Lerach describe him in Godfather-like 
terms, likening him to a ruthless don, willing to do whatever it takes to protect and 
extend his turf. To that end, Lerach developed an unprecedented system in which 
other plaintiffs [sic] firms were expected to pay tribute to Milberg Weiss to do 
business in California. 
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fifty-three of California’s one hundred largest high-tech companies.61 
In 1993, Lerach told the New York Times, “I’ve been in 400 securities 
class actions,”62 while estimating that Milberg Weiss had distributed 
more than $4 billion to investor-plaintiffs since the 1970s.63 
B. The Early 1990s: Strike-Suit King 
The linchpin of Lerach’s success in the early 1990s was his 
mastery of the so-called class action strike suit.64 The term “strike 
suit” referred to the immediate filing of a class action lawsuit against a 
publicly traded company alleging securities fraud just one day or 
several days after a significant downward drop in the company’s stock 
price.65 To file a lawsuit so quickly, plaintiffs’ attorneys often took on 
the nontraditional role of informing their clients of possible fraud. 
Only on the rarest occasion would a stockholder suspect that there 
was a possible violation of securities laws; rather, “the usual pattern 
[was] for a lawyer who specialize[d] in representing plaintiffs to take 
the initiative.”66 At times, suits were filed in less than twenty-four 
hours.67 Client ignorance “left [the attorney] with largely unfettered 
discretion in deciding what cases to bring, how to prosecute those 
cases, and how to settle them.”68 
The late 1980s and early 1990s “were the golden age of the strike 
suit, a period when California’s high-tech companies complained 
bitterly that Lerach would file a securities fraud claim the moment 
they missed a quarterly earnings projection.”69 To Lerach, however, 
 
Elkind, supra note 6, at 192. 
 61. Damon Darlin, A Nice, Clean California Industry, FORBES, Aug. 26, 1996, at 46, 46–47. 
 62. Fisher, supra note 58. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Drummond, supra note 17, at 24 (describing Lerach’s methods to ensure that he 
had priority as lead counsel among the California plaintiffs’ bar). 
 65. Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 108 (1993) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Richard J. Egan, Chairman of the Board, EMC 
Corp.); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2060, 2084–86 (“We believe it is 
appropriate to describe a class action as a ‘strike suit’ if a plaintiff’s attorney initiates the action 
without reasonable grounds to believe it has merit . . . .”). 
 66. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2060. 
 67. See id. at 2060 n.32 (“[O]f 46 class actions studied, 12 were filed within one day and 
another 30 were filed within one week of publication of unfavorable news about defendant 
corporation.” (citing Milt Policzer, They’ve Cornered the Market: A Few Firms Dominate the 
Derivative-Suit Arena, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at 1, 34)). 
 68. Perino, supra note 15, at 919–20. 
 69. Drummond, supra note 17, at 24. 
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the high-tech boom was an ideal situation for fraud to ferment. As he 
once told The New York Times, “[t]he compensation at high-tech, 
high-growth companies is disproportionately weighted toward stock 
options . . . . It creates a corporate culture where the year-to-year and 
quarter-to-quarter income levels of executives are dependent on the 
price of the stock.”70 Lerach believed he was combating a corporate 
culture of greed and cutthroat treachery that left investors with empty 
portfolios and CEOs unjustly enriched.71 The strike suit was his 
weapon. 
Many academics used “strike suit” as a pejorative term for class 
actions in the early 1990s because the merits of a case were viewed as 
subordinate to the pecuniary interests of the plaintiffs’ attorney.72 The 
term “professional plaintiffs” became widely used to describe 
individuals “who owned a few shares of stock in each of a large 
number of companies and who were willing to have their names 
attached to complaints.”73 To academics and corporations, 
professional plaintiffs were either pawns or accomplices in their 
attorneys’ quests for contingency-fee riches: 
The portrait of the typical named plaintiff that emerges from the 
case law demonstrates that plaintiffs’ attorneys recruit most of the 
investors in whose names they initiate class actions. . . . [P]laintiffs 
are poorly informed about the theories of their cases, are totally 
ignorant of the facts, or are illiterate concerning financial matters. In 
many others, the named plaintiff has a close relationship to the 
plaintiff’s lawyer or her firm. The most common recruitment 
 
 70. Fisher, supra note 58. Scholarly literature has, to some degree, corroborated Lerach’s 
theory that the nature of high-technology firms makes them particularly likely to commit 
securities fraud. See Perino, supra note 15, at 957–62 (noting that “executives of high-technology 
firms appear to receive a greater proportion of their compensation in stock options and 
therefore may engage in more trading” and that the firms themselves, given their new entry to 
the securities market, are less adept at forecasting financial information). 
 71. See Greider, supra note 41, at 12 (“Corporate moguls, Lerach explained, have a 
character flaw that is often fatal. ‘The CEO ultimately gets brought down by the very 
personality characteristics that made him successful in the first place . . . . How did these guys 
get to the point where they control a big public company? It’s not because they take no for an 
answer.’” (quoting William Lerach)). 
 72. See supra note 65. 
 73. R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors 
as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1999). 
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practice followed by plaintiffs’ attorneys apparently is to maintain a 
list of potential plaintiffs and their stockholdings.74 
Although Lerach disputed this characterization of his relationship 
with clients,75 he acknowledged that time was of the utmost 
importance in the competitive plaintiffs’ bar: “We want to control the 
case. We believe we can do the best job and we want to be first to file 
so that we can control the case . . . . [T]he courts historically have 
rewarded the first filed case with control of the case as lead 
counsel.”76 In an ultracompetitive environment in which courts were 
unwilling to dirty their hands working out which firm would best 
represent a class, judges chose lead counsel using the clearest 
available signal: which attorney won the race to the courthouse by 
filing first.77 The competitive conditions thus led to two starkly 
different opinions of strike suits: business interests and the academy 
regarded them as the product of dishonest plaintiffs’ attorneys 
manipulating clients for the lawyers’ personal pecuniary gains, 
whereas plaintiffs’ attorneys understood strike suits as the reality of a 
competitive market favoring alacrity. 
C. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
The perception of strike suits in the early 1990s was 
overwhelmingly negative, with plaintiffs’ attorneys accused of both 
fomenting unnecessary litigation78 and breaching ethical standards in 
their solicitation79 and prosecution of lawsuits.80 Additionally, big 
 
 74. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2060–61 (footnotes omitted); see also Perino, 
supra note 15, at 919 (“The plaintiffs’ attorney is supposed to act in the best interests of the 
class. But the typical members of the class were generally thought to have very small stakes in 
the outcome of the case—too small to make monitoring the attorney a cost-effective option.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Policzer, supra note 67, at 1, 34 (writing that Lerach denied maintaining a list 
of professional plaintiffs and claimed that clients often sought his help within hours of a stock 
price dropping). But see Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2059 n.28 (“Some firms 
repeatedly initiate class actions in the names of ‘professional’ plaintiffs who have widely 
dispersed and thinly spread stock holdings.”). 
 76. Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 80 (testimony of William S. Lerach). 
 77. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2099 (“[C]ourts virtually never consider the 
possibility that one aspiring lead plaintiff is more likely than another to monitor her lawyer’s 
conduct of the litigation.”). 
 78. See Perino, supra note 15, at 914 n.2 (describing the type of frivolous litigation 
Congress targeted). 
 79. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 172, 181 (Autumn 1997) (reporting that traditional rules prohibited 
lawyers from filing lawsuits first and then offering plaintiffs the opportunity to opt out). 
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business, the courts, and Congress all viewed the existence and use of 
“professional plaintiffs” as problematic to the interests of justice.81 
To remedy the perceived faults with the securities class action 
system, especially the problems with selecting lead plaintiffs, 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.82 The PSLRA reflected assumptions that (1) “plaintiffs’ 
attorneys initiated and managed securities class actions”;83 (2) 
“attorneys had incentives to pursue claims that were not optimal for 
corporations, shareholders, and the larger society”;84 and (3) 
“settlement was independent of the merits.”85 Overall, the PSLRA 
primarily targeted perceived excesses in the pursuit of lead-counsel 
appointment and the use of professional plaintiffs. 
The PSLRA modified securities law in several divergent ways. 
First, Congress made substantive and procedural modifications meant 
to affect all plaintiffs, not just professional plaintiffs (for example, 
changes in the scienter requirement, a heightened pleading standard, 
a cap on damages, and a stay of discovery pending a motion to 
dismiss).86 Second, Congress made targeted procedural reforms to 
specifically remove incentives for professional plaintiffs and their 
lawyers (for example, limitations on the number of complaints 
 
 80. See Junda Woo, Judges Show Growing Skepticism in Class-Action Securities Cases, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at B8 (reporting district judges’ disapproval of identical filings by 
different plaintiffs’ firms both (coincidentally or not) alleging that Phillip Morris engaged in 
deceptive practices to enhance their stature “in the toy industry” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Richard Owen, J., U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist. of N.Y.)). In the lawsuit reported in Woo’s article, 
Milberg Weiss was one of several firms representing the plaintiffs. Id. 
 81. See In re Urcarco Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 563 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (dismissing the suit 
and noting that the “[p]laintiffs seek to represent a class of investors who were allegedly 
defrauded by the concerted bad acts of this litany of wrong-doers, and have among their ranks 
one of the unluckiest and most victimized investors in the history of the securities business, one 
Mr. Steven G. Cooperman, who spends a good deal of his time being a plaintiff in class action 
securities fraud suits.”), aff’d sub nom. Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); S. REP. 
NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995) (“All too often, the same ‘professional’ plaintiffs appear as name 
plaintiffs in suit after suit.”); supra note 39 (making this point with respect to big business). 
 82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, 
at 32, 31–36 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“House and Senate Committee hearings on securities 
litigation reform demonstrated the need to reform abuses involving the use of ‘professional 
plaintiffs’ and the race to the courthouse to file the complaint.”). 
 83. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes 
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2006). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1493–94. 
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individuals could file, new penalties for frivolous filings, and changes 
to the way courts chose lead plaintiffs).87 Given its applicability to 
lead counsel selection and Milberg Weiss, this Section only explores 
the second category of changes, which addresses professional 
plaintiffs. 
The PLSRA includes several provisions empowering investors to 
control more aspects of litigation, which Congress hoped would rein 
in the plaintiffs’ bar.88 These new rules favor appointing institutional 
investors as lead plaintiff by removing the benefits of filing a lawsuit 
first.89 Institutional investors, such as pension and mutual funds, 
insurance companies, and banks,90 manage the money of thousands of 
investors, and were presumed to have a greater incentive to manage 
the behavior of class counsel than individual professional plaintiffs.91 
Under the new lead-plaintiff provision, the trial court selects lead 
plaintiff—the “most adequate plaintiff”—using certain criteria the 
PSLRA establishes.92 Based on Professors Weiss and Beckerman’s 
recommendations in the Yale Law Journal,93 courts applying the 
PSLRA must presume that the most adequate plaintiff is the one who 
has “the largest financial interest in the outcome of the case.”94 So 
that large institutions can learn of opportunities to enter these cases, 
the first plaintiff to file a suit also must give nationwide notice that 
the plaintiff has commenced the action.95 Congress’s encouragement 
of institutional investors to become lead plaintiffs was based on the 
assumption that large mutual funds and public-pension organizations 
have the resources and sophistication to control plaintiffs’ attorneys 
 
 87. Id. at 1494. 
 88. Fisch, supra note 79, at 176. 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
 90. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2091. 
 91. See id. at 2095 (“Institutional investors with large stakes in class actions surely are more 
capable than typical figurehead plaintiffs of effectively monitoring how plaintiffs’ attorneys 
conduct such litigation. Institutions’ large stakes give them an incentive to monitor, and 
institutions have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are acting as faithful champions for the plaintiff class.”). 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). 
 93. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995) (“This article provided the basis for the ‘most 
adequate plaintiff’ provision.” (citing Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13)). 
 94. Perino, supra note 15, at 923. 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (“The Committee intends 
‘publication’ to encompass a variety of mediums, including wire, electronic, or computer 
services.”). 
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and to guarantee that attorney behavior is consistent with the 
interests of the class.96 
Congress also prevented a person from serving as the class 
representative for more than five lawsuits in a three-year period.97 
The PSLRA further prohibits class representatives from receiving 
anything but a pro rata share of settlements or judgments.98 Together, 
Congress aimed these provisions to combat the problems of having 
uninformed or repeat plaintiffs or plaintiffs whose allegiances are to 
their lawyers and not their fellow class members.99 
Congress passed the PSLRA with Lerach and Milberg Weiss in 
its headlights. As one Silicon Valley securities lawyer told Fortune 
magazine, “[t]he way to understand the [PSLRA] . . . is [as] a bill of 
attainder against Bill Lerach.”100 Not coincidentally, Professor Elliott 
Weiss, reciting the events that transformed his and Professor 
Beckerman’s Yale Law Journal article into the lead-plaintiff provision 
of the PSLRA, cites his experience as a defense litigator in a New 
York securities fraud case as stimulating his desire for reform.101 
Milberg Weiss was lead counsel for the plaintiffs in that case.102 
 
 96. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis 
of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1593–97 (2006) 
(“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers would ‘no longer find it necessary to race to the courthouse’ but could 
instead more carefully investigate the merits of potential claims before deciding whether to file 
complaints. Furthermore, institutional investors might be solicited by plaintiffs’ law firms to 
become lead plaintiffs, but, as more experienced and sophisticated clients, such institutions 
would be better able to select competent class counsel.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Weiss & 
Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2106)). Included in this oversight assumption was the belief that 
large institutions would be more likely to negotiate or demand a reduction in attorney’s fees. Id. 
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
 98. Id. § 77z-1(a)(4). 
 99. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 96, at 1593–97 (“[S]ince institutional investors who 
manage other people’s money have fiduciary obligations to take ‘reasonable steps to realize on 
claims that will advance the interests of beneficiaries,’ proponents of the PSLRA structure were 
optimistic that institutional investors would become involved in these cases.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation: The 
Role of Institutional Investors, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 157 (Autumn 1997))). 
 100. Elkind, supra note 6, at 204. 
 101. Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or “Look 
What’s Happened to My Baby,” 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2008). 
 102. In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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II.  THE MILBERG SYSTEM: KICKBACKS AND FRAUD 
At the time the lead-plaintiff provision was proposed and 
incorporated into the PSLRA, class action reformers believed they 
completely understood the workings of the plaintiffs’ bar.103 Prior to 
the PSLRA, it was widely believed that plaintiffs’ lawyers had close, 
repeat relationships with certain clients or simply tricked unwitting 
clients into filing lawsuits. The 2006 federal indictment of Milberg 
Weiss for paying clients to file lawsuits, however, added a previously 
unknown wrinkle to the dynamics of the attorney-client relationship. 
To establish the ultimate conclusion that reformers based the 
lead-plaintiff provision of the PSLRA on incorrect assumptions, Part 
II gives the factual background about the actual operations of 
Milberg Weiss (that is, the story of kickbacks). Using Milberg Weiss’s 
federal indictment as a guide, this Part chronicles the scandal and 
offers an example of how the firm typically arranged kickbacks. By 
understanding the nuances of Milberg Weiss’s operations, one begins 
to appreciate how the PSLRA’s lead-plaintiff provision misdiagnosed 
the disease and prescribed the wrong medicine. 
To counter the natural rebuttal that understanding the 
operations of one firm is insufficient to understand the workings of 
the plaintiffs’ bar, Part II also includes an analysis of Milberg Weiss’s 
market share in securities class action litigation. The numbers show 
that Milberg Weiss came to control more than half of the class actions 
in the United States. These data prove that in many ways Milberg 
Weiss was the securities plaintiffs’ bar, and a problem with Milberg 
Weiss was a problem with the entire bar. 
A. The Kickback Scandal: How Milberg Weiss Really Operated 
The story of the Milberg Weiss kickbacks truly begins at the end 
of the conspiracy, when, finally, everyone in the plaintiffs’ and 
defense bars took notice of a practice widely rumored to have existed 
for years.104 In May of 2006, a federal grand jury in Los Angeles 
indicted Milberg Weiss and two members of the firm’s executive 
committee, David Bershad and Steven Schulman, for participation in 
 
 103. E-mail from Elliott Weiss, Charles E. Ares Professor Emeritus, James E. Rogers Coll. 
of Law, Univ. of Ariz., to author (Dec. 13, 2007, 09:02:23 EST) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (“Our article contained pretty much all we knew about attorney-client relationships 
involving the plaintiffs’ bar. We understood that some firms had ‘stables’ of clinets [sic], but that 
was about all.”). 
 104. Telephone interview with confidential source (Dec. 13, 2007). 
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a kickback scheme alleged to have begun more than twenty years 
earlier.105 Neither Melvyn Weiss nor William Lerach, who had left 
Milberg Weiss in 2004 to start his own firm, Lerach Coughlin,106 was 
named in the original indictment; however, both men were identified 
repeatedly as Partner A (Weiss) and Partner B (Lerach)107 in the 
charging document. The indictment alleged bribery, fraud, perjury, 
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice108 from the firm’s (and the 
lawyers’) participation in a scheme in which clients “received secret 
kickback payments to serve, or cause friends and relatives to serve, as 
named plaintiffs in lawsuits filed by Milberg Weiss.”109 In January of 
2007, a second superseding indictment was issued naming Melvyn 
Weiss as a defendant and further detailing the role of the firm’s 
executive committee in perpetrating the fraud.110 Between the late 
1970s and 2005, Milberg Weiss allegedly paid more than $11.3 million 
in kickbacks to clients from its own legal fees—fees that totaled $251 
million from cases that settled for billions of dollars.111 
The alleged kickbacks went primarily to individuals who agreed 
to serve as lead plaintiffs in New York, California, and Florida and to 
smaller law firms that served as fronts to launder money from 
Milberg Weiss to individual plaintiffs.112 The indictment named 
several defendants, generally well-off individuals capable of 
maintaining broad stock portfolios, who cooperated with Milberg 
Weiss to serve repeatedly as lead plaintiffs. In California, Seymour 
Lazar, a wealthy property owner in Palm Springs,113 and Dr. Steven 
Cooperman, a Los Angeles ophthalmologist,114 both served as repeat 
plaintiffs for Milberg Weiss actions.115 The latter, Cooperman, 
 
 105. Julie Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2006, at A1. 
 106. Elkind, supra note 10, at 169. 
 107. Id. at 156. 
 108. First Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 10–89, 93. 
 109. Press Release, Thom Mrozek, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 
Melvyn Weiss, Co-Founder of Milberg Weiss Law Firm, Indicted in Secret Kickback Scheme 
Involving Named Plaintiffs in Class-Action Lawsuits (Jan. 20, 2007), available at http://online. 
wsj.com/public/resources/documents/milbergweisspr.pdf. 
 110. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 13–14. 
 111. Id. at 14. 
 112. Id. at 9–13. 
 113. Id. at 2. 
 114. Id. at 3. 
 115. For Judge Kendall’s observation in In re Urcarco Securities Litigation, 148 F.R.D. 561, 
563 (N.D. Tex. 1993), that Cooperman was one of the unluckiest investors alive, see supra note 
81. 
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revealed the kickback arrangement to federal prosecutors in an effort 
to reduce his sentence for insurance fraud in 1999.116 According to 
Cooperman, Milberg Weiss paid him a portion of its attorney’s fees 
when he served as lead plaintiff in class actions.117 To position 
Cooperman as a plaintiff, Lerach encouraged him to purchase a 
diversified portfolio of stocks.118 Cooperman told federal prosecutors 
that he or his family and friends had participated in approximately 
seventy lawsuits119 and received $6.2 million for their efforts.120 
One of the cases listed in the indictment against Milberg Weiss, 
Steven Cooperman v. Newhall Land & Farming Co.,121 illustrates both 
how the arrangement operated and the methods Milberg Weiss used 
to conceal payments. According to the indictment, in April 1988, 
Lerach informed Cooperman that “Milberg Weiss would pay him and 
[a relative] a percentage of Milberg Weiss’s fee”122 in a case against 
Valencia, California–based land developer Newhall Land and 
Farming Company if he served as lead plaintiff in a class action suit.123 
In early 1988, to prevent hostile takeovers by corporate raiders, 
Newhall planned to adopt new partnership agreement provisions and 
issue new stock, which would have diluted the value of outstanding 
shares.124 Long-term investors in Newhall expressed concern over 
management’s decisions, which they viewed as self-serving 
modifications to save executive jobs instead of maximizing stock 
 
 116. Elkind, supra note 10, at 160. 
 117. Id. at 163. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 13. 
 121. Steven Cooperman v. Newhall Land & Farming Co., No. CA001093 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
filed Apr. 19, 1988), cited in Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 27. 
 122. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 27. 
 123. See Briefly, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1988, at 2 (reporting that shareholders sued Newhall 
and William Lerach represented the plaintiffs). 
 124. Because Newhall was a partnership with publicly traded units, it was possible for 
outsiders to acquire an interest in the company and exercise control over management 
decisions, thus exposing the firm to takeover. James F. Peltz, Newhall Land, A Partnership with 
Takeover Jitters, Seeks Defense, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1988, at 1. The L.A. Times reported, “The 
proposals also gives [sic] Newhall Management the authority, without prior approval by unit-
holders, to issue new classes of units that could be used to thwart a raider. But Newhall also 
acknowledged that the new stock would dilute the ownership of its current unit-holders, which 
is particularly annoying to . . . Newhall investors.” Id. 
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price.125 Local newspapers reported these developments in the weeks 
prior to, and during, the time Lerach contacted Cooperman.126 
According to the federal indictment, Cooperman probably 
acquired an interest in the company in early April,127 around the time 
local newspaper coverage began, and Lerach filed suit on April 19, 
1988, “alleg[ing] that the proposals would ‘make any takeover of 
Newhall absolutely impossible’ and [were] meant to entrench current 
management.”128 Although Newhall had outstanding shares valued at 
more than $754 million,129 the 105-year-old California company, with 
major institutional investors across the United States,130 fell prey to a 
Los Angeles ophthalmologist who probably had owned stock in the 
company for less than a month. 
The indictments against Lerach and Milberg Weiss rely on court 
filings from the Newhall case to build the government’s case against 
Lerach and the firm. According to prosecutors, Cooperman 
represented to the court in those filings that “Plaintiffs . . . do not 
have interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those they represent 
as class representatives.”131 That misrepresentation became (eighteen 
years later) Overt Act No. 171 in furtherance of the conspiracy to 
obstruct justice, commit perjury and mail fraud, and engage in illegal 
kickbacks in the indictment filed against Milberg Weiss.132 Within six 
months of Cooperman filing the Newhall lawsuit, the company agreed 
 
 125. Id. One Chicago securities trader whose firm owned more than $20 million of Newhall 
stock complained that Newhall “[wa]s attempting to do something to really hurt our 
investment.” Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 27. The indictment indicates that 
Newhall was Lerach’s first arrangement with Cooperman. Id. The indictment states, “Between 
in or about April and November 1988, Lerach told Cooperman that Milberg Weiss would pay 
[them] a percentage of Milberg Weiss’s fee in [Newhall].” Id. Since the lawsuit was filed on 
April 19, Lerach and Cooperman would have had to agree to file the lawsuit sometime prior to 
this date, but still in or about April. The local newspapers reported on the events approximately 
one week earlier. It seems reasonable to conclude from the “in or about” language that 
Cooperman purchased the stock in April to position himself for the lawsuit. 
 128. Briefly, supra note 123 (reporting William Lerach’s description of the lawsuit and his 
concerns about Newhall’s planned corporate defensive maneuvers). 
 129. This figure was reached by multiplying Newhall’s 19.8 million total shares with its price 
in April 1988 of $38.125. See Peltz, supra note 124 (reporting Newhall’s total outstanding shares 
and share price in April 1988). 
 130. See id. (listing a few of Newhall’s major shareholders). 
 131. First Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 64 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Steven Cooperman v. Newhall Land & Farming Co., No. CA001093 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 
19, 1988)). 
 132. Id. 
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to a settlement, under which it would repurchase $40 million of its 
own stock, make “‘minor changes’ in three of five anti-takeover 
provisions that [stockholders] approved,”133 and pay the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees of approximately $2 million134 ($1.8 million of which 
went to Milberg Weiss).135 
The indictment contended that soon after the fee was awarded in 
late 1988 or early 1989, Cooperman asked that Lerach pay him his 
portion quickly.136 Lerach, Melvyn Weiss, and David Bershad agreed 
to pay Cooperman his promised portion (between 5 and 10 percent) 
by “disguising the payment as a refundable option on a painting 
Cooperman owned,”137 Pablo Picasso’s 1932 Reclining Nude.138 
Thereafter, they paid Cooperman $175,000 by personal check.139 
Although Cooperman and Lerach had filed papers with the court 
stating that Cooperman’s interest was not antagonistic to the 
unnamed class plaintiffs,140 Cooperman walked away with a 
substantial amount of his attorney’s money in his pocket, despite his 
negligible and brief ownership in Newhall. Milberg Weiss took more 
than $1.5 million in fees for only five months of representation, even 
after the payments to Cooperman. 
Milberg Weiss’s false representations to the court and the 
violation of the fiduciary duty owed to the absent unnamed parties, 
not the “strike suit,” put the firm on the wrong side of the law in 
Newhall and at least 180 other cases.141 Both the named plaintiff in a 
class action lawsuit and the attorneys for that plaintiff owe the absent 
class members a fiduciary duty not to put the named plaintiff’s 
interest first, give preferential treatment to the named plaintiff, or act 
in any manner intended to deceive the court.142 And although the 
 
 133. James F. Peltz, Newhall Agrees to Buy Back Units to Help Settle Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 1998, at 4. 
 134. Newhall Land Plan to Buy Back Investor Units OK’d, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1988, at 9F. 
 135. First Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 64 (Overt Act No. 173). 
 136. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 28 (Overt Act No. 17). 
 137. Id. (Overt Act No. 19). 
 138. Id. at 29 (Overt Act No. 21). 
 139. Id. (Overt Act No. 21). 
 140. First Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 64 (citing Steven Cooperman v. Newhall 
Land & Farming Co., No. CA001093 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 19, 1988)). 
 141. Elkind, supra note 10, at 156 (reporting the number of cases). 
 142. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (“Likewise, a 
stockholder who brings suit on a cause of action derived from the corporation assumes a 
position, not technically as a trustee perhaps, but one of a fiduciary character. He sues, not for 
himself alone, but as representative of a class comprising all who are similarly situated.”); 
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PSLRA was the first time that Congress explicitly forbade kickbacks 
to plaintiffs,143 given how the payments were concealed, the attorneys 
involved in making and concealing kickbacks understood the illicit 
nature of their dealings with Cooperman. 
Aside from the bogus down payment for the Picasso painting in 
Newhall, the government’s case against Milberg Weiss reads like a 
Hollywood thriller when naming the methods Milberg Weiss used to 
cover its tracks and make its payments. For instance, Steven 
Schulman, a partner in Milberg Weiss’s New York office, procured 
new clients by paying stockbrokers for client lists.144 In his testimony 
to the government, one stockbroker (only identified as Stockbroker 
A) recounted how Schulman and he would meet at budget motels in 
Newburgh, New York, (seventy miles north of Schulman’s New 
Jersey home) and place their briefcases under the table to make the 
money exchange for these lists.145 
 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”). Prosecutors stressed this point in the second 
superseding indictment: 
Because the conduct and decisions of a named plaintiff in a class action or 
shareholder derivative action affect the interests and rights of class members or 
shareholders who are not before the court, the named plaintiff owes these absent 
class members or shareholders certain fiduciary duties. As a result of these legally 
imposed duties, a named plaintiff, among other things: (a) may not place his or her 
own interests above those of absent class members or shareholders; (b) may not act in 
a deceitful or unethical manner toward the court or the absent class members or 
shareholders; and (c) is required to disclose to the court any fact that reasonably 
could affect his or her ability to fairly or adequately represent the interests of the 
absent class members or shareholders. 
Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 6. 
 143. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2006) (“[T]he plaintiff will not accept any payment 
for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff’s pro rata share of 
any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court . . . .”). 
 144. US Says Milberg Weiss Partner Literally Passed Money “Under the Table,” FORTUNE, 
July 12, 2007, http://legalpad.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2007/07/12/us-says-milberg-weiss-partner-
literally-passed-money-under-the-table/. One New York defense attorney reflected that the 
common presumption in the early 1990s was that Milberg Weiss paid stockbrokers for 
information and then contacted clients, see Telephone Interview with confidential source (Dec. 
13, 2007), not that the firm paid clients. 
 145. [Attorney:] Okay. Tell us, in as much detail as you can, the actual way in which the 
cash was physically transferred from Mr. Schulman to you, and in what form it was 
provided to you in terms of packaging or the like. 
  [STOCKBROKER A:] We would be sitting at a table, having breakfast, and Mr. Schulman 
had a briefcase that was under the table, and I had my briefcase under the table. I would 
take out what was in his briefcase and put it into my briefcase, give him back his 
briefcase, close up my briefcase. And there were packages of hundred dollar bills, packs 
of hundred dollar bills. 
  [ATTORNEY:] So the money was passed, literally, underneath the table? 
  [STOCKBROKER A:] Under the table. 
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Aside from the excesses in the Schulman example, Milberg 
Weiss generally transferred money to clients by first sending it to 
small law firms in various parts of the country.146 Milberg Weiss could 
then record these payments in the firm’s accounting books as 
“referral fees” paid,147 which is a permissible use of fees awarded in a 
case.148 The smaller laundering firm then transferred the money to the 
client, circumventing any judicial scrutiny.149 In total, the $11.3 million 
in known kickbacks were paid as follows:150 
The final row for stockbrokers, as suggested in the testimony against 
Steven Schulman, contains no entries because none are listed in the 
indictment. But, if the allegations by Stockbroker A are true, then the 
$11.3 million figure represents only a fraction of Milberg Weiss’s total 
kickbacks. 
The kickback story becomes murkier after the passage of the 
PSLRA in 1995 because, theoretically, the PSLRA’s lead-plaintiff 
provision should have diminished the effect of filing a complaint first. 
 
Government’s Consolidated Opposition to Motions by Defendants Steven G. Schulman, 
Seymour Lazar, and Paul T. Selzer to Dismiss Indictment Due to Invalid Honest Services Fraud 
Theory; Exhibits Attached Separately ex. 3, at 30–31, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & 
Schulman LLP, No. CR 05-587(A)-JFW (C.D. Cal. filed July 11, 2007) [hereinafter Sworn 
Statement of Stockbroker A], available at http://fortunelegalpad.files.wordpress.com/2007/07/ 
exhibitc-stockbrokera.pdf. 
 146. See Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 10–11 (listing the intermediary 
firms Milberg Weiss used in Los Angeles, Portland, Oregon, Wichita, Denver, and throughout 
California). 
 147. Id. at 22–23. 
 148. Id. at 23. 
 149. Id. at 10–11. 
 150. All information in the chart is derived from Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 
10, at 11–14; Sworn Statement of Stockbroker A, supra note 145, at 26–31; Elkind, supra note 
10, at 163–170. 
Recipient of Kickback Number of Lead-
Plaintiff Cases
Total Received from 
Milberg Weiss
Seymour Lazar, 
Real estate owner 
67 cases, 1976-2004 $2,600,000 
Howard Vogel, 
Real estate broker 
40 cases, 1991-2005 $2,500,000 
Steven Cooperman, 
Ophthalmologist (CA) 
70 cases, 1988-1999 $6,200,000 
Unnamed Plaintiffs 
(FL) 
60 cases, 1983-1999 Unknown 
Stockbrokers Unknown number of 
referrals 
Unknown 
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The indictment against Milberg Weiss, however, chronicles ongoing 
payments to clients through 2005, primarily to Howard Vogel and 
Seymour Lazar.151 Neither the first nor the second indictment lists 
William Lerach as having participated in the kickback scheme after 
the PSLRA. Lerach confirmed this in a correspondence: 
[T]he evidence of my involvement was much less than with respect 
to certain others and there was no evidence of any active 
participation by me after the passage of the 95 Act which, for the 
first time, explicitly forbid payments to plaintiffs, thus raising serious 
statute of limitations issues . . . . 
  . . . The 95 Act prohibited extra payments to class plaintiffs or 
brokers and as to any cases filed after the effective date of the 95 
Act I scrupulously adhered to its provision. It turns out that 
apparently certain people at Milberg Weiss did not comply—that 
was something I did not know about—but unfortunately, under 
criminal conspiracy law, is something I faced exposure for.152 
Yet, some individuals at Milberg Weiss perceived some utility from 
continuing to pay for named-plaintiff status, which accounts for the 
payments through 2005. 
By 2002, the media reported that Milberg Weiss was under 
federal investigation for its payments to plaintiffs.153 Although the 
firm and, notably, Lerach received positive attention for securing 
lead-plaintiff status in the class action suits against the banks and 
accounting firms involved in the Enron scandal,154 more negative 
attention ensued as the federal investigation of the law firm continued 
 
 151. See Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 38–45 (chronicling Milberg 
Weiss’s filing of at least fifteen new lawsuits following the PSLRA). 
 152. E-mail from William S. Lerach to author (Dec. 11, 2007, 14:02:19 EST) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Lerach, Second E-mail]. 
 153. For example, the New York Times reported, 
  A federal grand jury is investigating whether a leading class-action law firm based 
in New York paid plaintiffs to take part in investor suits against companies . . . . 
  The investigation focuses on Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, a law firm 
that has filed hundreds of shareholder lawsuits against some of the nation’s largest 
corporations and that was responsible for 85 percent of all securities class actions in 
California last year. 
Milberg Weiss Faces Inquiry, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at C3. 
 154. See Michael Brick, Lawyer Known for Class Actions Will Lead the Enron Plaintiffs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at C1 (noting Lerach’s role as lead attorney and his record of 
success). 
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to linger.155 Further attention followed Lerach and Weiss’s decision to 
split the firm in 2004.156 By the time the grand jury issued indictments 
in 2006, much of the damage to Milberg Weiss had already been done 
by years of negative publicity.157 
In the summer of 2007, former Milberg Weiss managing partner 
David Bershad, who kept the safe of cash used to pay many of the 
kickbacks, became the first person named in the indictment to plead 
guilty, forfeiting approximately $8 million and agreeing to serve 
between two and three years in federal prison.158 On September 18, 
2007, Lerach agreed to plead guilty to a felony charge,159 forfeit $7.75 
million, and serve between one and two years in prison.160 Under the 
arrangement, Lerach admitted that he caused his clients to “falsely 
certify to a federal court that he hadn’t received any payments, 
beyond reasonable costs and expenses.”161 According to Lerach, “I did 
this because I was guilty, and because under the plea arrangement, 
the prosecutors accepted my position that I not cooperate against 
others, that my new firm [Lerach Coughlin] and its partners not be 
subjected to further investigation or prosecution.”162 Schulman pled 
guilty to a federal racketeering charge in October 2007.163 Finally, 
Melvyn Weiss pled guilty to fraud in March 2008, agreeing to serve 
three years in prison and pay $10 million in fines.164 
 
 155. See John R. Wilke, U.S. Pushes Broad Investigation into Milberg Weiss Law Firm, 
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at A1 (mentioning alleged “secret, illegal payments to plaintiffs” 
and potential “criminal charges against the firm itself and its principals”). 
 156. Kara Scannell, Milberg Weiss to Split in Two: West Coast, East Coast Firms, WALL ST. 
J., June 12, 2003, at B2 (noting the firm’s plan to split up). 
 157. As William Lerach related, 
What did badly disadvantage Milberg Weiss in obtaining lead plaintiff appointments 
is the increasingly negative publicity surrounding the criminal investigation which was 
exploited by competitors to gain competitive advantage against Milberg Weiss, both 
in the search for clients and in lead plaintiff contacts. With the ultimate indictment of 
the firm and certain of its senior partners, these developments proved, in my opinion, 
fatal. 
Lerach, Second E-mail, supra note 152. 
 158. Peter Elkind, Milberg Weiss Hits the Canvas, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2007, at 40, 40. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Nathan Koppel, Investigation of Milberg Lands a Pivotal Figure; Lerach Agrees to 
Pleas, Could Go to Prison; Gains Forfeited to U.S., WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2007, at B4. 
 161. Id. (characterizing the allegations to which Lerach would admit). 
 162. Lerach, Second E-mail, supra note 152. 
 163. Michael Parrish, Bail Is Set for Lawyer Who Sued for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2007, at C3. 
 164. Jonathan D. Glater, High-Profile Trial Lawyer Agrees to Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
21, 2008, at C1. 
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B. Milberg’s Market Dominance 
In isolation, the guilty pleas of a half-dozen attorneys should 
have been inconsequential to the plaintiffs’ bar. But William Lerach 
and the attorneys at Milberg Weiss did not face the intense 
competition that typifies the defense bar. Rather, an analysis of 
Milberg Weiss’s market share shows that the firm controlled the 
market for securities class actions. Surprisingly, this market 
domination only increased post-PSLRA, a testament to the 
ineffectiveness of Congress’s so-called “bill of attainder” against 
Milberg Weiss and William Lerach. Although Congress expected the 
lead-plaintiff provision to encourage institutional investors to check 
the power of firms like Milberg Weiss, an analysis of Milberg Weiss’s 
market share reveals that, in reality, this expectation was unfounded. 
Statistical models of plaintiffs’-firm market shares show that the 
PSLRA did little to curb the influence of Milberg Weiss or lawyer-
driven litigation. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers found that in 
2001, Milberg Weiss filed about 60 percent of all securities class 
actions in the United States and 80 percent of cases in California.165 In 
those cases, 50 percent of Milberg Weiss’s clients were institutional 
investors, up from 5 percent prior to the passage of the PSLRA.166 
Cornerstone Research’s ongoing study of class action settlements also 
tracked the growing dominance of Milberg Weiss after the PSLRA 
and through 2006.167 Between 1997 and 2004, Milberg Weiss served as 
lead counsel in 50 percent of settled securities class actions in the 
United States.168 By 2006, Lerach Coughlin served as lead counsel in 
31 percent of all settled cases, and Milberg Weiss handled 23 percent 
(54 percent combined),169 showing that their share of the market still 
continued to increase after 2004. 
The data on market share is corroborated by Professors Choi 
and Thompson, whose research on lead-counsel selection led them to 
conclude that many of the intended reforms of the PSLRA lacked the 
efficacy Congress predicted.170 Their data showed neither a substantial 
 
 165. Drummond, supra note 17, at 24–25. 
 166. Id. at 25. 
 167. LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SERV. 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 16 (2007), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2006/Settlements_Through_12_2006.pdf. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1514–15, 1529–30. 
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entry of new firms nor an exit of larger old firms from the securities 
bar.171 New firms that did enter the market rarely participated as lead 
counsel in a lawsuit.172 As other top plaintiffs’ firms began to lose 
market share post-PSLRA, Milberg Weiss held relatively steady. For 
instance, Milberg Weiss’s share of the securities market (as measured 
in settlement dollars obtained in class actions) remained at 27.9 
percent pre-PSLRA and 27.4 percent post-PSLRA—a loss of only 0.5 
percent.173 The next four top securities firms combined controlled 28.3 
percent pre-PSLRA and 24.8 percent afterwards, which is a loss of 3.5 
percent.174 Further, this data set did not include recent litigation data, 
such as the Enron settlement in which Lerach, serving as lead 
counsel, obtained approximately $7 billion for defrauded investors.175 
C.  Moving Beyond Kickbacks 
In a hard lesson in unintended consequences, the law originally 
aimed at diminishing the influence of Lerach and Milberg Weiss 
seemed to foster their ascendance to almost monopolistic dominance 
of the plaintiffs’ bar. By 2004, 50 percent of Milberg Weiss’s clients 
were institutional investors, up from 5 percent pre-PSLRA. Although 
kickbacks could be paid to individual clients, the firm used other 
tactics to recruit institutions. This Section briefly examines these 
recruitment methods to account for the other factors that contributed 
to the firm’s prowess. Some of these recruitment tactics, although not 
the focus of the Milberg Weiss scandal, evidence a class action system 
with more problems than just kickbacks. 
First, the institutional investors (for example, public retirement 
funds) favored by the PSLRA have established repeat relationships 
with large plaintiffs’ firms.176 In the same way that lawyers could count 
on certain professional plaintiffs to file lawsuit after lawsuit, these 
institutional investors have found it profitable to lead class action 
 
 171. Id. at 1514 (“Looking beyond the largest five firms, we do not see substantial entry or 
exit after the enactment of the PSLRA. Of all plaintiff lead or co-lead law firms that appear in 
our survey post-PSLRA but did not appear pre-PSLRA, the average number of suits was only 
1.51; only three firms in this group had at least four suits.”). 
 172. Id. (“[N]ew plaintiff law firm entrants in the post-PSLRA period represented only a 
small fraction of the total market share of firms.”). 
 173. Id. at 1515 tbl.3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Jeff Bailey, CIBC Pays to Settle Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at C1; Judge 
Approves 3 Enron Banks’ Civil Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at C2. 
 176. Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1528–29. 
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after class action.177 Evidence also suggests that these institutions rely 
heavily on the direction of plaintiffs’ firms instead of developing 
expertise in house to guide decisionmaking.178 
Large plaintiffs’ firms have also used political influence and 
maneuvering to secure lead-counsel selection. Some firms hired 
lobbyists179 and gave campaign contributions to persuade elected 
officials responsible for selecting lead counsel to represent public 
retirement funds.180 Indeed, Milberg Weiss was one of three law firms 
to disclose publicly that it hired such lobbyists.181 
In addition to paying questionable campaign contributions to 
public pension managers and using lobbyists to persuade fund 
managers, a rumor suggests that Milberg Weiss paid a share of its 
attorneys’ fees to labor pension funds it represented to secure 
business—a potential violation of labor laws that bar paying referral 
fees for union business.182 Milberg Weiss and other top firms can 
make these payments and recruit institutional investors because they 
have capital not generally present in plaintiffs’ firms.183 William 
Lerach believes that Milberg Weiss was able to successfully adapt to 
the changes of the PSLRA and traced much of that success to the 
firm’s established position: 
Anytime where you have a dominant law firm, obviously that 
dominant and preeminent law firm is disadvantaged by the very fact 
that the rules have been changed. Clearly the existing system 
worked well for them. However, Milberg Weiss, perhaps not 
perfectly, adapted relatively quickly to the new order. It relatively 
 
 177. See id. at 1528 (noting that the prevalence of institutional investors serving as lead 
plaintiffs has increased markedly since Congress enacted the PSLRA). 
 178. See id. at 1529, 1528–30 (“Institutional investors may lack the time, resources, or ability 
to distinguish among companies in deciding where to bring a fraud suit. Instead of developing 
such costly expertise in-house, institutional investors may turn to a select group of plaintiff law 
firms for ongoing information and advice.”). 
 179. Cox & Thomas, supra note 96, at 1611. 
 180. Id. at 1613. 
 181. Id. at 1614 n.111 (citing public records from Alaska and California). 
 182. E-mail from confidential source (Dec. 13, 2007). For an example of a similar allegation 
leveled toward Milberg Weiss, see Posting of Peter Lattman to Law Blog, http://blogs. 
wsj.com/law/2006/06/22/milberg-weiss-watch-hello-springfield-ill-lawyer-william-cavanaugh/ 
(June 22, 2006, 16:15 EDT). 
 183. See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 
YALE J. ON REG. 435, 476 (1995) (claiming that “plaintiffs’ law firms would have to be huge” to 
invest adequate capital into many mass tort suits). 
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quickly came to represent a large number of institutional clients and 
continued to do very well economically for itself.184 
Lerach has acknowledged the shortcomings of laws that help firms 
like Milberg Weiss: “Of course, making the rules more difficult, [or] 
the capital requirements more onerous favors established firms, but 
does not mean it [was] good public policy.”185 
Regardless of the tactic, the evidence suggests that law firms 
continue to be chosen using suboptimal criteria such as personal 
relationships, as opposed to quality of representation. 
III.  A NEW SYSTEM: ADDING DISCLOSURES AND SCREENING TO 
LEAD-COUNSEL SELECTION 
The final Part of this Note attempts to create a system of counsel 
selection in which “quality of representation” becomes the primary 
selection factor. This Part assumes, based on the preceding two Parts 
describing the state of lead-plaintiff selection, that the original goals 
of the lead-plaintiff provision of the PSLRA—to prevent plaintiffs’ 
attorneys from initiating and managing securities class actions186 and 
to ensure settlements consistent with the merits of a case187—remain 
unfulfilled.188 By adopting a new approach to counsel selection based 
on information disclosure, this Part suggests reforms that would allow 
the original PSLRA goals to take steps toward fulfillment. 
 
 184. Telephone Interview with William S. Lerach (Dec. 13, 2007) (notes from interview on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 185. Lerach, First E-mail, supra note 43. 
 186. Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1490. 
 187. Id. 
 188. By suggesting reform in the wake of the Milberg Weiss scandal, this Note does not 
imply that the plaintiffs’ bar is corrupt; rather it assumes that plaintiffs’ law firms are honest but 
continue to operate in a system full of vulnerabilities that are easily exploitable and hardly 
detectable. The investigation against Milberg Weiss proceeded for nearly seven years without 
an indictment. See Elkind, supra note 10 (noting that Cooperman first began cooperating with 
prosecutors in 1999). In one of Peter Elkind’s many significant investigative pieces for Fortune, 
he recounts the story of Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Robinson, who followed Cooperman’s 
original lead for years before a case began to emerge. Id. at 164. Even press reports in 2005 
showed that securities lawyers remained unaware that Milberg Weiss had been engaged in this 
practice for twenty years or, possibly, naïve that what Milberg Weiss was doing was violating the 
law. See Justin Scheck, Lerach Hunkers Down After Indictment, RECORDER (S.F.), Aug. 16, 
2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1124109328500 (“Yet despite the seriousness with 
which [Milberg and Lerach] are taking the investigation, many securities lawyers—most of 
whom are reluctant to speak publicly about it—remain puzzled by the investigation’s focus and 
skeptical that it will result in serious charges.”). 
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This Part is divided into three Sections. Section A identifies the 
problems of lead-counsel selection, drawing inferences from the 
Milberg Weiss scandal. Section B traces these problems to a broader 
underlying cause that academics and reformers have not previously 
identified—informational asymmetries between plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and judges. Using a system in which the law presumes that the most 
adequate plaintiff is the wealthiest one prevents the judge from 
considering pertinent information on plaintiff and attorney quality. 
Therefore, Section C concludes with a list of possible reforms that 
would limit or eliminate many of the information disparities judges 
currently face. Through disclosure requirements and screening 
procedures, these reforms could significantly reduce plaintiff 
attorneys’ opportunities to exploit informational asymmetries in the 
lead-counsel selection process.  
A. Areas Needing Reform—Pre- and Post-Scandal 
To draft meaningful reforms in selecting lead plaintiffs, it is 
necessary to summarize the problems that exist in the selection of 
lead counsel, despite the provisions of the PSLRA. Using the 
example of Milberg Weiss (both the legal and illegal aspects),189 this 
Section compiles a list of the problems with the selection of lead 
counsel. The first two points present continuing problems that were 
also problems prior to the PSLRA; the second two points list 
problems that the downfall of Milberg Weiss revealed. 
1. Race to the Courthouse.  Despite the PSLRA, the 
entrepreneurial spirit of plaintiffs’ lawyers still leads a number of 
them to file lawsuits within hours of a precipitous stock drop.190 Even 
though the PSLRA limited the first-to-file advantages, many 
attorneys still prefer to win the race to the courthouse because it 
allows them to post notice of the class action before their competitors, 
increasing the likelihood their firm will attract the client with the 
largest loss.191 
 
 189. See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 190. Perino, supra note 15, at 967 (“[The] pre-PSLRA strategic race to the courthouse has 
now been transmogrified into a race to publish the first notice. The net result, however, is the 
same—an incentive to file actions quickly.”); Weiss, supra note 101, at 561. 
 191. Id. 
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2. Use of Professional Plaintiffs. Although institutional investors 
have become more active plaintiffs, especially in high-profile cases 
like Enron, firms still use professional plaintiffs—establishing repeat 
relationships with individuals and institutions. For instance, Howard 
Vogel, the frequent Milberg Weiss client, filed two lawsuits and an 
affidavit in support of a proposed settlement between May 24, 2004, 
and September 23, 2004, with Milberg Weiss as his counsel.192 Even 
though this was permissible under the PSLRA provision limiting an 
individual to serving as lead plaintiff in five securities class action 
lawsuits in any three years,193 it indicates that the continuing presence 
of professional individual plaintiffs is possible. Additionally, empirical 
evidence suggests that plaintiffs’ firms and institutional investors are 
forming repeat relationships; Professors Choi and Thompson found 
evidence that some institutional investors were serving as repeat 
plaintiffs in multiple post-PSLRA class actions.194 Perhaps more 
alarmingly, the institutions developed repeat relationships with the 
largest plaintiffs’ firms, including Milberg Weiss.195 
3. The Market for Awarding Lead-Plaintiff Status Is Imperfectly 
Competitive and Tends toward Oligopoly or Monopoly.  The analysis 
of market share between Milberg Weiss and the other top four firms 
in the securities plaintiffs’ bar shows that Milberg Weiss controlled 
more than 50 percent of cases in a given year.196 Professors Choi and 
Thompson found that the top-five plaintiffs’ firms garnered three-
fifths of all settlement awards in the late 1990s and early 2000s.197 
Further, they found little evidence of new participation by small firms 
in the class action market after the PSLRA,198 whereas Milberg 
Weiss’s and Lerach’s market share continually increased.199 
4. The Recruitment Process of Clients, Already a Substandard 
Method for Choosing Counsel, Is Mired in Secrecy.  Although the 
Milberg Weiss indictment involved individuals as opposed to 
institutional investors, the recruitment of indivduals and institutionas 
 
 192. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 10, at 43–44. 
 193. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006). 
 194. Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1528. 
 195. Id. at 1528–29. 
 196. See supra text accompanying note 168. 
 197. Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1515 tbl.3. 
 198. Id. at 1514. 
 199. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. 
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is characterized by secretive dealings and ambiguous relationships. As 
this Note has observed, established plaintiffs’ firms use a number of 
tactics, including paying questionable campaign contributions to 
public pension managers, hiring lobbyists to persuade fund managers, 
and using fees from labor organizations, to perpetuate their market 
control.200 This problem is especially pressing because private 
institutional investors, like hedge funds, have been less involved in 
securities class actions than public pension funds and unions,201 with 
whom the dealings are more likely to occur.  
*          *          * 
When reformers tackled the race to the courthouse and 
professional plaintiffs in the early 1990s, their solutions were market 
based—using the PSLRA to substitute richer and presumably more 
sophisticated institutional clients for poorer ones to increase client 
monitoring of attorneys.202 But, contrary to Professors Weiss and 
Beckerman’s assumptions, the incentives of institutional investors, 
both public and private, are sufficiently complex203 that monitoring 
the behavior of class counsel will not always be a top priority. The 
presence of repeat relationships, combined with evidence that large 
institutions are not being aggressive in lowering attorneys’ fees for the 
class204 and mixed findings on the ability of institutions to increase 
 
 200. See supra Part II.C. 
 201. Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1504 (“There has been a substantial increase in 
participation of public pension firms, a group that includes well-known public employees’ funds 
such as CalPERS, NYCERS, and funds related to various unions. At the same time, there has 
not been substantial involvement by private institutional investors, such as mutual funds, banks, 
and insurance companies. In the words of one federal appellate judge, ‘the mutual funds won’t 
touch it.’” (quoting Panel Discussion, The Private Securities Law Reform Act: Is it Working?, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2363, 2369 (2003) (statement of Edward R. Becker, C.J., U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit))). 
 202. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 13, at 2106 (“Institutions, as experienced and 
sophisticated consumers of legal services, are in little danger of succumbing to the kind of 
pressure or influence at which the ethical proscription of in-person solicitation is directed.”). 
 203. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 83, at 1504–05 (“Serving as a lead investor and 
monitoring litigation costs money and takes the time of employees who otherwise could be 
engaged in alternative income-producing activities. Litigation may expose the institution to 
expensive discovery and unwanted revelation of information about its investments and strategy. 
It may also subject the fund to adverse responses from those with whom it does business 
(including, for example, if it manages funds in a 401(k) plan for other corporations).”). 
 204. Id. at 1529 (“Institutions that depend on particular lead plaintiff law firms for 
information and expertise about litigation across repeat litigation are unlikely to negotiate 
vigorously with plaintiff law firms for lower fees.”). 
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recoveries as a percentage of the loss,205 suggests that reliance on 
institutional investor responsibility is misplaced. The PSLRA’s 
market-oriented solutions, which rely on the honesty of plaintiffs and 
their ability to monitor their attorneys, fail to understand or directly 
address the problem of unscrupulous attorney behavior. This 
behavior exists because information about clients and the merits of 
cases is held by attorneys instead of courts. It is this informational 
imbalance that reformers must correct. 
B. The Presence of Asymmetrical Information 
Client-based solutions to attorney abuse have been somewhat 
ineffectual. Recognizing that attorneys, not clients, instigated and 
perpetuated the Milberg Weiss scandal, this Note constructs a 
framework of lead-counsel selection that focuses on attorneys instead 
of clients. This framework assumes that the law can affect the 
behavior of plaintiffs’ attorneys to maximize their honesty. The 
problems with dishonesty this Note has identified have a common 
source: asymmetrical information. Economists use “asymmetrical 
information” to refer to situations in which one party to a transaction 
or bargain has better information than the other party, preventing 
market participants from accurately judging the quality of goods or 
services in the market.206 Because attorneys face few requirements to 
disclose their recruiting methods or the substance of their client 
relationships to the courts, judges have difficulty adequately 
screening the merits of the putative class counsel. This Section 
explains why information imbalances create these problems. 
During lead-plaintiff selection, the PSLRA mandates review of 
plaintiffs vying for appointment as lead plaintiff but not their 
lawyers.207 Under the PSLRA’s lead-plaintiff provision, judges must 
consider which plaintiff has the “largest financial interest in the relief 
 
 205. Cox & Thomas, supra note 96, at 1636 (“Our real concern about institutions is that they 
do not seem to be able to increase dollar recoveries at the same pace as Provable Losses. This is 
disappointing and facially inconsistent with institutional lead plaintiffs’ beliefs that they can 
double or triple recoveries overall.”). 
 206. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME 
THEORY AND THE LAW 79–80 (1994) (defining asymmetric information); J. Hirshleifer, Where 
Are We in the Theory of Information?, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 37 (1973) (same). 
 207. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006) (requiring courts to review potential lead plaintiffs’ 
financial interests, ability to represent the interests of the class, and susceptibility to unique 
defenses). 
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sought by the class.”208 Courts presume that the plaintiff with the 
largest financial interest is the most adequate, but the law does not 
require courts to scrutinize that plaintiff’s choice of counsel.209 
Although courts ultimately have discretion to accept a plaintiff’s 
choice of counsel,210 the PSLRA neither compels courts to review that 
choice nor instructs courts how to do so.211 Even more, despite the 
requirement in Rule 23212 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
district courts evaluate the adequacy of class counsel, Rule 23(g) 
offers no substantive criteria to prevent the potential abuses 
particular to securities litigation.213 Like the PSLRA, Rule 23 relies on 
a market-based approach that largely defers to a plaintiff’s choice of 
counsel, raising the same troubling implications about how much 
information is actually reaching judges.214 
In the modern system, judges are never required to consider 
whether an institutional investor selected class counsel because of the 
firm’s expertise in the subject matter, because the firm made 
campaign contributions to political figures, or because the firm paid 
kickbacks. Pre- and post-PSLRA lead plaintiff and counsel selection 
are remarkably similar—both systems relied primarily on a single 
presumption in selecting lead plaintiff; before the PSLRA, judges 
 
 208. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(bb). 
 209. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (“The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval 
of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.”). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging 
Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1288 (“[T]he statute is silent as to 
the criteria or method that the lead plaintiff should employ in selecting and retaining counsel. 
Nor does the law dictate that the lead plaintiff must monitor counsel’s efforts and participate in 
settlement decisions.”). 
 212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a 
class must appoint class counsel.”). 
 213. Id. Rule 23(g) states that a court must consider “the work counsel has done in 
identifying . . . potential claims,” “counsel’s experience in handling class actions,” “counsel’s 
knowledge of the applicable law,” and “the resources that counsel will commit to representing 
the class.” Id. 23(g)(1)(A). The court may consider “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s 
ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” Id. 23 (g)(1)(B), which, by 
its language, vests the court with the discretion to investigate or abstain, id.; see also Casey, 
supra note 211, at 1289–90 (detailing the many places in securities certification in which judges 
have discretion when dealing with class counsel). 
 214. See discussion infra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.  
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identified the first plaintiff to file suit;215 post-PSLRA, judges focus on 
the client with the largest claimed losses.216  
The PSLRA also did not address the prior system’s failure to 
give judges significant information about attorney quality. Judges 
need two types of information—verifiable and non-verifiable.217 The 
PSLRA requires disclosure of neither type. Judges can check 
verifiable information (such as the number of the lawsuits the 
attorney has filed or settled) about a firm before making a decision. 
Nonverifiable information (such as an attorney’s negotiation skills) 
involves inferences and a risk of error in decisionmaking, thus 
requiring judges to use signaling and screening to evaluate lawyers.218 
In terms of verifiable information asymmetries post-PSLRA, the 
Milberg Weiss scandal shows that many judges could not discern 
repeat professional plaintiffs from other claimants. The PSLRA 
requires plaintiffs to provide statements listing all federal securities 
class actions in which they have sought to serve as lead plaintiff in the 
preceding three years.219 Although this information should be readily 
verifiable, the example of Howard Vogel’s three filings in five months 
indicates that, to some extent, judges were (and are) not performing 
background searches (such a search would also have shown Vogel’s 
37 other lawsuits with Milberg Weiss). 
Regarding nonverifiable information post-PSLRA, attorneys still 
do not present information about plaintiff-recruitment procedures to 
judges; for instance, attorneys generally do not reveal that they 
lobbied for institutional investors to hire them as counsel, and that 
information is difficult for courts to verify without extensive research 
costs. Further, courts struggle to obtain information about a firm’s 
history of candor before courts when selecting lead plaintiffs. To 
 
 215. For a discussion of why “filing first” was the clearest signal available to judges, see 
supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Casey, supra note 211, at 1289 (“[The PSLRA’s] legislative history also advises that 
Congress intended to preserve ‘the court’s discretion under existing law to approve or 
disapprove the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel when necessary to protect the interests of the 
plaintiff class.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 35 (1995))). 
 217. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 206, at 89 (discussing the differences between 
“verifiable” and “nonverifiable” information). 
 218. Cf. id. at 123 (discussing how employers can use screening and employees can use 
signaling to exchange nonverifiable information). 
 219. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v) (2006). 
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eliminate uncertainty, plaintiffs’ attorneys could signal220 to courts 
their quality by presenting private information about themselves or 
their abilities that the judge cannot otherwise observe.221 Information 
about attorneys’ honesty is absent in the PSLRA system. Instead, 
attorneys present judges with hollow biographical information about 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys and boilerplate language about the quality of 
the law firm.222 Judges can voluntarily screen large pools of attorneys 
by establishing procedures that sort high-quality from low-quality 
attorneys (such as auctions).223 The text of the PSLRA contains no 
such procedures, nor does it require judges to perform background 
searches on prospective lead plaintiffs or counsel.224 
C. Reforming the System 
Although this final Section does not attempt to draft an entire 
system for judges to use in selecting lead counsel, it does offer several 
reforms based on observed deficiencies that both the judiciary and 
Congress could implement without unreasonable burden or delays. 
To remedy current information asymmetries between lawyers and 
judges, mandatory disclosures made at various stages of litigation 
should be required. Next, nonverifiable information could be 
obtained if courts gave more time for law firms to signal their quality 
 
 220. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 206, at 122–23 (discussing how signaling by parties 
possessing nonverifiable information and screening by uninformed parties can facilitate 
information exchange). 
 221. Cf. id. at 123 (“Industrious workers, for example, may be able to signal that they are 
hard workers by completing a training program that lazy workers would find too taxing.”). 
 222. For example, one motion for lead counsel appointment stated, “[t]he law firms have 
extensive experience in the area of securities litigation and have successfully prosecuted 
numerous securities fraud class actions on behalf of injured investors,” and then referred the 
judge to supporting affidavits. Memorandum in Support of the City of Saginaw Police & Fire 
Pension Board’s Motion for Consolidation of All Related Actions, Appointment as Lead 
Plaintiff, and Approval of Its Selection of Lead Counsel at 14, Jacksonville Police & Fire 
Pension Fund v. Am. Int’l Group, Nos. 08-CV-4772, 08-CV-5072, 08-CV-5464, 08-CV-5560, 
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 2008), 2008 WL 4487375. 
 223. See id. (“Screening takes place when the uninformed players can choose actions that 
lead informed players to act in a way that reveals information.”). For example, a judge could 
decide to award fees only for a settlement in excess of $500 million. In such a case, probably 
only high-quality attorneys would continue to seek lead counsel appointment; low-quality 
attorneys looking for quick settlements would withdraw. Because the primary screening process 
the PSLRA mandates is the consideration of which plaintiff had the largest losses, judges never 
encounter information about lawyers and their qualifications to represent a class. 
 224. See Casey, supra note 211 at 1288–89 (noting the similarity in pre- and post-PSLRA 
selection methods while pointing out that the legislative history indicates the act did intend to 
foster a private-auction process managed by institutional investors). 
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prior to counsel selection. By expanding the use of counsel-selection 
schemes (a screening process), which depend on attorneys revealing 
information about their ethics and past performances, judges could 
ferret out the best attorneys from quick-settlement artists. 
1. Verifiable Information and Disclosures.  First, courts must 
incorporate verifiable information during their selection of a lead 
plaintiff (who in turn selects lead counsel). Requiring sworn affidavits 
to the court subject to mandatory double checking and scrutiny could 
eliminate the use of both individual and institutional professional 
plaintiffs. This fix would begin with a more rigorous review of the 
plaintiffs, both institutions and individuals, by requiring those parties 
to disclose under penalty of perjury every case in which they have 
been involved during the past five years. This disclosure would 
expand the PSLRA requirement by two years, add significant 
penalties for dissembling, and, most importantly, add a mandatory 
review process by court officers or judges. These disclosures would 
include both state and federal cases, and verification would be 
required for any plaintiff strongly considered for the lead-plaintiff 
position. People or institutions that have recently served as lead 
plaintiffs should bear a presumption against appointment, regardless 
of whether they have not yet reached the PSLRA limit of five 
lawsuits. This presumption would replace or complement the current 
language that favors the appointment of the plaintiff with the largest 
financial interest.225 The development of a government-run computer 
database accessible to both state and federal judges, similar to the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,226 would substantially 
assist the judge applying these new requirements in assessing a 
particular plaintiff’s qualities. Judges could eliminate the Howard 
Vogels of the class-action system with a simple name search, and 
harsh penalties of perjury and contempt of court could bolster 
attorney acquiescence and honesty. 
Following lead-plaintiff selection, a second round of scrutiny of 
law firms vying for lead-counsel appointment should occur. This 
scrutiny would eliminate secretive plaintiff recruitment and add 
competition to the highly concentrated market of lead-counsel firms. 
Given that class actions require attorneys to act in a fiduciary capacity 
 
 225. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 226. Stanford Law Sch. & Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). 
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toward the class,227 rigorous scrutiny of a plaintiff’s choice of 
competent and qualified counsel promotes the interests of all the 
claimants who have no voice in the selection of their legal 
representative. Given the absence of clear standards in the PSLRA 
and Federal Rule 23,228 scrutiny would mean enumerating several 
criteria that judges should apply when judging qualified counsel. 
These criteria should draw out information about attorney quality 
and experience with class action lawsuits. 
A useful proxy that the new system could incorporate for quality 
of representation employed in Cornerstone Research’s examination 
of law firm quality229 is the amount of fees recovered from a 
settlement or judgment as a percentage of the total losses suffered by 
the represented class. If attorneys knew that judges would use their 
performance in a case to judge their future fitness to serve as class 
counsel, they would state allegations and damages in complaints with 
greater specificity and accuracy. They would also avoid handling cases 
when they believed their representation likely could not garner a fee 
award that future courts, reviewing their performance, would deem 
satisfactory. The percentage of damages recovered could be 
measured and presented to courts in future litigations. 
Whether the federal law also requires firms to disclose whether 
they lobbied institutional investors or made campaign contributions 
to officials responsible for hiring attorneys for public institutions, at a 
minimum, it must develop some system of disclosures. The system 
should have enough flexibility that lawyers can determine how they 
can best show courts their qualifications to serve as lead counsel, but 
the system must also be consistent. Although scholars, courts, 
lawyers, and legislators should debate which indicators of attorney 
quality courts should use, these groups should agree that, in the wake 
of the Milberg Weiss scandal, courts need to judge the quality of 
potential lead counsel with verifiable data. 
2. Nonverifiable Information and Screening.  With respect to 
nonverifiable information, judges can reduce information 
 
 227. E.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Beyond their ethical obligations to their clients, class attorneys . . . also owe 
the entire class a fiduciary duty once the class complaint is filed.”). 
 228. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text (noting the current absence of standards 
in the PSLRA and the Federal Rules). 
 229. SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 167, at 16 tbl.16. 
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asymmetries by screening potential lead attorneys for quality.230 
Reasonable examples of screening methods already in place should 
inspire judges to use screening in the future. For instance, in In re 
Cendant Corp. Litigation,231 one federal judge implemented an 
auction to choose lead counsel.232 Although it disapproved of the 
auction method,233 the Third Circuit recognized that such a screening 
procedure could be an appropriate method for lead-counsel selection 
in certain circumstances.234 
In Cendant, the auction involved two stages—bidding and 
matching low bids.235 Competing firms submitted bids proposing what 
percentage of any settlement fee or recovery each firm would take.236 
Once the court determined which firm presented the lowest 
acceptable bid for fees, the court gave the lead plaintiffs’ law firm the 
opportunity to match that bid and assume lead-counsel position.237 
The court exercised its discretion by rejecting and accepting bids as 
well as assessing the qualifications of the nine firms that competed in 
the auction.238 Allowing the firm selected by the plaintiff to voluntarily 
match the low-bid retains some of the autonomy of the PSLRA while 
still revealing firm quality. As Professor Baird notes, “[T]he 
willingness of a party to agree voluntarily to a term in a contract may 
signal the party’s [quality]. Imposing a mandatory term may prevent 
 
 230. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 231. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 232. Id. at 218. 
 233. Id. at 220. 
 234. Id. (“Although we believe that there are situations under which the PSLRA would 
permit a court to employ the auction technique, this was not one of them.”). The Third Circuit 
went on to state that the PSLRA “evidences a strong presumption in favor of approving a 
properly-selected lead plaintiff’s decisions as to counsel selection and counsel retention.” Id. at 
276. A court could conduct an auction if the court was convinced that the plaintiffs did not select 
their counsel in good faith. Id. 
 235. Id. at 225. 
 236. Id. at 225 n.5 (“Movants were directed to propose fees depending on the phase at which 
the litigation was resolved (the horizontal axis) and the size of the eventual recovery (the 
vertical axis). The phases of litigation listed on the grid were: from pleadings through 
adjudication of any motion to dismiss; during discovery through adjudication of a summary 
judgment motion; after adjudication through a trial verdict; and post-trial. The sizes of recovery 
listed on the grid were: first 100 million; second 100 million; third 100 million; next 50 million; 
next 50 million; next 50 million; next 50 million; and over 500 million.”). 
 237. Id. at 225. 
 238. Id. (“The District Court solicited input about how the auction should be conducted and 
held a hearing . . . . The District Court rejected [one] bid . . . which would have generated fees of 
1–2% of the total settlement . . . characterizing it as unrealistic and ‘quasi-philanthropic . . . .’” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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this signaling and thereby reduce the amount of information 
transferred.”239  
The Cendant auction-matching method meets Professor Baird’s 
requirements because, after signaling, the firm that the lead plaintiffs 
wanted was given the choice to take the role of lead counsel—the 
court did not impose any truly mandatory terms. A firm had to be 
realistic but competitive because the attorneys’ fees depended both 
on the law firm’s bid and the firm’s ability to garner a high recovery. 
The firm had to realistically forecast how large of a recovery it could 
expect for a class, while also considering how much it would cost the 
firm to generate a high recovery. The auction forced firms to reveal 
two pieces of information: expectations and costs. With these two 
variables, courts now had more data to select lead counsel then 
otherwise available under the strict PSLRA lead-plaintiff analysis. 
With this information, the court eliminated certain firms based on 
unrealistic estimates the firms offered—the district court rejected a 
bid of 1 to 2 percent as “unrealistic and ‘quasi-philanthropic,’ and 
stat[ed] that ‘unless the eventual monetary recovery in this case is in 
the billions, such an apparently “cheap” fee does not make 
professional sense.’”240 Regardless of how a court structures the 
auction, the availability of multiple informational factors allows for 
better assessments of attorney quality and a positive step worthy of 
repetition.241 
Although courts do not need to copy the Cendant example or 
even use an auction, they can, without fear of reversal, allow a longer 
pretrial period for different firms to demonstrate their qualities. This 
lengthened pretrial period would allow judges to assist lead plaintiffs 
by suggesting factors plaintiffs should consider when picking counsel. 
Drawing from the bankruptcy code, judges could appoint temporary 
trustees to aid in the counsel-selection process.242 These trustees could 
serve as temporary representatives of the class action until all 
plaintiffs and counsel are appointed and capable of fulfilling their 
fiduciary obligations. Courts could receive these trustees’ advice on 
 
 239. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 206, at 147. 
 240. In re Cendant, 264 F.3d at 225 (quoting the district court). 
 241. See Casey, supra note 211, at 1308–11 (providing a comprehensive discussion of 
auctions in securities class actions). 
 242. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 327(a)–(e) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
the trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one or more attorneys . . . that do not hold or 
represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or 
assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties . . . .”). 
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matters and attorney behavior and use it to ensure attorney integrity. 
Alternatively, judges could inquire why plaintiffs make their 
selections and receive affidavits detailing any prior relationships 
between plaintiffs and lead counsel.243 Under either option, however, 
allotting more time prior to court hearings for investigation of the 
plaintiffs in a case can only reduce the possibility of fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
The Milberg Weiss scandal should be a wake-up call to reformers 
who believed their modifications in the PSLRA would end securities 
class action abuse. Although William Lerach and Milberg Weiss are 
no longer going to dominate the field, the securities class action 
system remains vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation. Because 
“private securities class actions currently represent the principal 
means by which financial penalties are imposed in cases of securities 
fraud and manipulation,”244 the class action mechanism must remain 
free of the fraud and abuse to which the Milberg Weiss scandal 
showed it is susceptible. Encouraging or requiring freer dissemination 
of information by attorneys and lead plaintiffs to the courts would 
limit the possibilities of future abuse and monopolization, as in the 
Milberg Weiss scandal. More information disclosure should also 
mean greater competition among plaintiffs’ firms for lead-counsel 
status in class action suits. Although this Note has not addressed 
whether competition is necessarily a good thing for a class of 
defrauded investors, it is better than a monopolized market in which 
the pecuniary interests of a few large law firms seeking fast 
settlements drive results. 
If Congress does not make these reforms, then it will have done 
nothing to prevent the emergence of the next Milberg Weiss. From 
questionable recruitment tactics of state pension funds to the lack of 
safeguards stopping professional plaintiffs, Congress can address 
many avenues of reform. With Milberg Weiss out of the picture, the 
opportunity for reform is ripe. 
 
 243. This Note does not address the potential transactional costs for judges who inquire into 
attorney qualifications during lead-counsel selection, which, as Section B notes, may be 
substantial. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 244. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and 
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006). 
